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Introduction 
Political scientists have devoted a considerable amount of attention to 
devising various measures or classificatory schemes of state interparty com-
petition (ipc).' These endeavors served a useful heuristic purpose and 
assisted in characterizing the complexion of state ipc generally, two func-
tions signific ant especially in the developmental stages of the literature on 
state parties. 2 
Too often, though, these conceptual initiatives lacked focus. 
Classificatory systems can be evaluated properly only by reference to the 
larger purposes they are to serve. That is, these constructs are not ends in 
themselves but rather are research tools designed to assist in the investiga-
tion of more pervasive political phenomena. 3 Such a focus materialized in 
the state policy literature,• one aspect of which sought to assess the relative 
effectiveness of socioeconomic and political factors (e.g., ipc) in explaining 
interstate policy variation. This "policy focus" now is a central considera-
tion of research on state politics. It is possible, therefore, to specify two 
criteria for the evaluation of various ipc measures: 1) their ability to por-
tray accurately the character of political competition in the states, and; 
2) the ease and precision-both practical and theoretical-of their incor-
poration into the current structure of research on state political systems. We 
wish here to argue concerning the deficiencies of previous measures of ipc, 
and, in addition, present a new measure which overcomes most of these 
shortcomings. 
Deficiencies of Previous Indices 
With the above two critieria in mind, two classes of prob-
lems-tec hnical and theoretical-become apparent in the various ipc indices 
extant in the literature. 
Dawson and Robinson indicated three major technical problem 
areas-time periods considered, offices included, and the ways of looking 
at competition within the context of the first two factors. s The time period 
selected for the competition index should roughly coincide with the time 
period of the policy data. 6 Concentration upon one office is unreliable. ' 
And if the states are to be treated as policy "systems," then measures which 
include non-state races (e.g., U.S. Senators) are unsatisfactory, 8 regardless 
of how useful they may be for indicating the general contours of state party 
competition. Further, while state legislators are pivotal policy actors, con-
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sideration of these offices is often excluded. 9 Finally, several meas ur 
resort to either placing the states into various competitive categories 10 or 
rank ordering the states according to the degree of ipc. 1 1 But the categ ories 
are sometimes rather crude, often not logically distinct, and usually obsc ure 
subtle but important distinctions among the states in any given categ ory, 
Rank ordering can be misleading if the states happen to fall in clusters, and 
it does not permit complex statistical operations as would be the case if the 
data were presented in interval form. 
A more serious technical problem concerns the manner in which 
legislative competition is usually measured. Several of the meas ures 
employed in state policy research 12 have focused on three aspects of ipc : one 
minus the percentage of the popular vote of the victorious guberna torial 
candidate, and one minus the percentage of seats won by the majority party 
in each house of the state legislature. Though having the advantages of data 
availability and ease of measurement, this approach can distort the actual 
situation of party conflict in the states. It is possible, for example, that a 
legislature having, say, 100 seats could be divided equally between the two 
parties. Yet it is also logically possible that each of these elections was un. 
contested by one of the parties. Thus this approach would classify this situa. 
tion as one of "perfect" competition, clearly a distortion of actua l com. 
petitive conditions. While this admittedly is a rather extreme examp le, it is 
usually the case that a substantial proportion of legislative electio ns arc 
decided by lopsided margins. 
The theoretical prob lem concerns the linkage of these previous ipc con-
structs. It will be recalled that the impetus for this literature was the "Key 
theory," which stated that ipc exerts an interveni ng influence betwee n state 
economic conditions and state spending for "redistributive issues ." 13 Can-
didates in competitive districts will favor a greater level and range of public 
services in an attempt to secure the votes of the large middle and lower mid-
dle class voter blocs. The crucial linkage, then, is between the deg ree of 
competition and public policy. Previous ipc measures, by cou ntina 
legislative seats already won by the parties, totally ignore the extent of com-
petition in the actual legislative elections. In effect, previous indices arc 
measures of "legislative or parliamentary" competition rather than " elec• 
tora l " competition. These measures therefore suffer from a theoretica l defi-
ciency since the Key theory posits an electoral rather than a parliame ntarJ 
linkage between competition and policy. 
A Proposed New Measure 
One method of overcoming the problems of measuring legislative com· 
petition discussed above would be to calculate the average vote of all can· 
dictates of the victorious party in the elections for both houses of the 
legislatures. This would in a way be similar to the previous measures but in· 
stead wou ld focus on the extent of competition in each legislative district. 
While this approach is preferred over previous measures, it still wou ld not 
overcome a serious problem common to both approaches. For example , ac· 
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ording to a distribution of seats measure of ipc both New York and Illinois 
c re highly competitive states.•• However, most races are in fact not highly 
a ontested, with Democrats controlling Cook County and Republicans con-
~rolling downstate in Illinois, and Democrats controlling New York City 
and Republicans controlling upstate in New York. These conditions could 
be identified by an ipc measure which focused on individual legislative 
races, but by averaging the vote of all the candidates of the victorious party 
these non-competitive conditions within the state would cancel each other 
out, once again producing a higly competitive score. In effect such indices 
are actually measures of one-party dominance rather than measures of in-
terparty competition. 
A new ipc measure is proposed here, one that is theoretically sound in 
that it is addressed to competition in each legislative district, and is capable 
of identifying the actual patterns of competition in the states. This new 
rneasure has three components, the average of which represents a composite 
ipc index: 
J. one minus the proportion of the popular vote of the victorious 
gubernatorial candidate; 
2. one minus the average vote of all victorious candidates in elections 
for the upper house of the state legislature, and; 
3. one minus the average vote of all victorious candidates in elections 
for the lower house of the state legislature. 
The major shift entailed by this new measure is that attention is focused 
on the extent of competition in state legislative races regardless of party. 
This approach is preferable for technical reasons because it avoids the kind 
of problems posed by the Illinois and New York examples. More important 
is the fact that this technique is superior in theoretical terms. The Key 
linkage is addressed to the degree of party competition in a state political 
system rather than the extent of ohe-party dominance. Perhaps this point 
was obscured in subsequent applications of the linkage due to the fact that 
Key described politics in the South at a time when one-party dominance and 
interparty competition meant essentially the same thing. When applied out-
side the South in a different historical period, however, this distinction 
becomes crucial, both empirically and theoretically. And we argue that only 
by focusing on the idea of competition (regardless of party) as described 
above can we: a) measure the extent of actual political competition in the 
states, and b) construct an ipc index amenable to the framework of contem-
porary research on comparative state public policy. 
APPENDIX 
This new ipc measure can be represented algebraically as follows: 
n m 
g + 1/ n E Si + 1/ m E hi 
ipc 1 - i=l i=l 
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where g 
n 
s· I 
m 
h· I 
= 
= 
= 
proportion of the vote receive d by winning gubern ato rial can-
didate 
numb er of races fo r the upper house of the state legislature 
proportio n of the vote of the winning ca nd idate in the "j th" 
race 
num ber of races for the lower house of the state legislat ure 
pro portio n of the vote of the winning candidate in the "j th" 
race 
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